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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Don Jacob Setoki, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for unlawful possession of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Defendant moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the evidence was 
insufficient for 'Tack of any kind of physical corroborating evidence/' Now, on 
appeal, he claims the evidence was insufficient to show his constructive possession 
of drugs and paraphernalia. Did the trial court plainly err for not sua sponte 
dismissing the State's case for insufficiency of the evidence to show constructive 
possession? 
verdict of not guilty." Id. The trial court denied the motion, finding there was 
"prima facie evidence of the crimes alleged/' Id. 
A jury found defendant guilty on both counts. R83. On October 9,2008, the 
trial court entered judgment, sentencing defendant to an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years on the felony count and to an unspecified jail term1 on the 
misdemeanor count, suspending both terms, and placing defendant on probation 
for 24 months. R139-40. Defendant timely appealed. R148. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The crime 
On May 5, 2007, Officer Christopher Dowland of the West Valley Police 
Department stopped defendant for speeding. R150:36-37. When Officer Dowland 
approached defendant's car to speak to him, defendant, the only occupant in the 
vehicle, opened his car door. R150:38. Defendant said that he did not have his 
1
 The sentencing minutes state that the court imposed a prison term of up to 
five years on defendant's conviction for drug possession. R139. That term was 
suspended. Id. As to the conviction for paraphernalia possession, the minutes state 
only the following: "SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE - The court orders the 
deft receive credit for time served on count 2." R140. No transcript of the 
sentencing hearing is included in the record on appeal. Adult Probation and Parole 
recommended in its presentence investigation report that defendant "[s]erve 69 
days in the Salt Lake County Jail with credit for 69 days served." PSI at 2. 
3 
friend/' Id. Defendant told the officer "he had purchased it for personal use." 
R150:43. 
Justin Bechaver, a forensic scientist at the Utah State Crime Laboratory, 
analyzed the substance in the baggie and determined that the substance was 
methamphetamine. See R150:57, 62; see also R150:41 (stipulation on chain of 
custody). 
The defense 
Defendant's father testified on defendant's behalf. See R150:80. He said that 
he owned the car where the drugs were found and that he had lent it to his son on 
the day of the incident. R150:80~81. He said that his car needed a new starter and 
sunshade and that two weeks before the incident he had visited an auto yard 
looking for used parts. R150:82-83. He said that while removing a sunshade kit, a 
sunglasses case fell down and he thought that he "could do with a second pair of 
sunglasses," so he took it. R150:83. 
When he got home, he opened the case. R150:84. Inside he found a small 
plastic pipe and a small packet of "some white substance." Id. He had not "seen 
these things before." Id. Suspecting the white substance was "something that [he 
had] seen people sniff on TV," he wanted "to keep it away from the reach of 
anybody" until he could dispose of it. Id. So he "wrapped it up again in that 
sunglass package and left it in the middle console of the car." R150:85. 
5 
friend for his own use. Thus, the trial court did not err, let alone obviously err, in 
not dismissing defendant's drug charge. 
Second, even if defendant's drug paraphernalia charge was based on 
constructive possession, the evidence was sufficient to support that charge. 
Specifically, defendant's occupancy of the car, the connection between defendant 
and the drugs found in the car, defendant's admission that he had purchased the 
drugs for his own use, and the pipe's location in the car with the drugs all 
supported a finding that defendant constructively possessed the pipe. Thus, the 
trial court also did not err, let alone obviously err, in not dismissing defendant's 
paraphernalia charge. 
7 
Preservation and plain error. To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant's 
objection "must be sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial 
court." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,113,95 P.3d 276. (quotations and citation omitted). 
This means that a defendant "must enter an objection on the record that is both 
timely and specific/' State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App.1993). "The 
objection must 'be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error' of 
which [the party] complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App.1998) 
(quoting Tolman v. Wincliester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App.1996) 
(quotation and citation omitted). This preservation rule "applies to every claim, 
including constitutional questions." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 346. 
And, if a defendant does not preserve his claim below, this Court may review his 
claim only for plain error. Id. at f 11. 
Defendant brought a motion to dismiss below. The motion, however, rested 
on his claim that the State had not met its burden to prove the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt because it had not presented any physical evidence corroborating 
Officer Dowland's testimony concerning defendant's guilt. Thus, defendant claims 
for the first time on appeal that the State had not proved constructive possession. 
Because defendant did not raise this specific claim below, defendant can only obtain 
review of his claim by demonstrating plain error. Id. In other words, defendant 
9 
"for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 
% 15, 63 P.3d 94 (citation omitted). 
When an insufficiency claim is brought under the plain error doctrine, a 
defendant must show not only "that the evidence was insufficient to support [his] 
conviction," but "that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the 
trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, <f 17. 
Elements of the offenses. To prove possession of a controlled substance, the 
State must establish that defendant "knowingly and intentionally... possess [ed] or 
use[d] . . . a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 
2007). To prove possession of drug paraphernalia, the State must show that 
defendant knowingly and intentionally "use[d], or [] possessed] with intent to use, 
drug paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 58~37a-5 (West 2004); State v. Layman, 1999 
UT 79, If 13,985 P.2d 911. 
Possession. '"Possession/" for purposes of Utah's drug and drug 
paraphernalia laws, "means the joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, 
holding, retaining, belonging [or] maintaining . . . of controlled substances." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(ii) (West Supp. 2007). Where the defendant is found in 
11 
support a finding of constructive possession. See United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 
1009,1016 (10th Cir. 2006). Testimony that a defendant may have placed something 
in the spot where the police later found an item can support a finding that the 
defendant possessed the item. See United States v. Flenoid, 718 F.2d 867,868 (8th Cir. 
1983). Even where a relevant factor does not by itself establish a sufficient nexus 
between a defendant and contraband, the cumulative effect of multiple factors can. 
See Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 35. 
A. Defendant actually possessed methamphetamine. 
As stated, actual "possession" or "use" means "the joint or individual 
ownership, control,... [or] holding" of such substances. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-2 (West Supp. 2007). Here, the evidence sufficed to show that defendant actually 
controlled the methamphetamine upon which his drug charge was based. Officer 
Dowland testified that he saw the baggie containing the methamphetamine in the 
door handle and that he saw defendant "grab[] the bagg[ie], [and] put[] it in 
between his legs. R150:39. When the officer asked defendant to exit the car, he saw 
defendant "grab[] onto the bagg[ie] and place[] it in between the center console and 
the driver's seat." R150:39-40. Thus, the officer saw defendant actually possessing 
the controlled substance. In addition, defendant told the officer that "he had 
purchased [the methamphetamine] from a friend." R150:42. The officer's testimony 
on the matter was also evidence of actual possession. The testimony demonstrated 
13 
the areas within the car. Moreover, defendant admitted that he actually possessed 
the methamphetamine, that he had been using methamphetamine for several days, 
and that he had purchased the methamphetamine for his own use. See R150:42-43. 
And Officer Dowland testified that the pipe could be used to smoke narcotics. 
R150:42. Under these circumstances, the evidence also sufficed to permit an 
inference that defendant had both the power and intent to exercise control over the 
paraphernalia. 
Finally, even if the evidence was insufficient to show constructive possession 
of the pipe, that insufficiency was not obvious. As stated, the pipe was found with 
drugs in a car in which defendant was the sole occupant, defendant admitted he 
intended to use the drugs for his own use, and the pipe was a means by which to 
use those drugs. Under these circumstances, any insufficiency in the evidence to 
establish constructive possession of the pipe would not have been obvious. 
In sum, defendant has not established that the trial court erred or plainly 
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges in this case. Thus, defendant's 
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U.C.A. 1953§58-37a-5 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 37A. UTAH DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT 
§ 58-37a-5. Unlawful acts 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, 
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into 
the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsec-
tion is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug 
paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufac-
ture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a con-
trolled substance into the human body in violation of this act. [FN1] Any person 
who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a person 
under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person making the 
delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, maga-
zine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the purpose of 
the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Laws 1981, c. 76, § 5. 
[FN1j Laws 1981, c. 76, that enacted this chapter. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102. 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq. 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301. 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4- 302. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-2 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 58, OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 37. UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
§ 58-37-2. Definitions 
(1) As used m this chapter: 
(a) "Administer" means the direct application of a controlled substance, whether 
by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means, to the body of a patient 
or research subject by: 
(l) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent; or 
(ii) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the presence of the 
practitioner. 
(b) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the direction 
of a manufacturer, distributor, or practitioner but does not include a motor car-
rier, public warehouseman, or employee of any of them. 
(c) "Consumption" means ingesting or having any measurable amount of a controlled 
substance in a personfs body, but this Subsection (1)(c) does not include the me-
tabolite of a controlled substance. 
(d) "Continuing criminal enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, 
partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and 
any union or groups of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, 
and includes illicit as well as licit entities created or maintained for the pur-
pose of engaging in conduct which constitutes the commission of episodes of activ-
ity made unlawful by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, which episodes 
are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, 
victims, methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlaw-
ful conduct and be related either to each other or to the enterprise. 
(e) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of a drug, substance, 
or immediate precursor under Section 58-37-3. 
(f)(i) "Controlled substance" means a drug or substance included in Schedules I, 
II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also includes a drug or substance in-
cluded in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal Controlled Substances Act, 
Title II, P.L. 91-513 [FN1], or any controlled substance analog. 
(ii) "Controlled substance" does not include: 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov, Works. 
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is lawfully purchased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter 
medication without prescription; or 
(F) dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or other similar substances 
including concentrates or extracts, which are not otherwise regulated by law, 
which may contain naturally occurring amounts of chemical or substances listed 
in this chapter, or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 4 6a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(h) "Conviction" means a determination of guilt by verdict, whether jury or bench, 
or plea, whether guilty or no contest, for any offense proscribed by Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, or for any offense under the laws of the 
United States and any other state which, if committed in this state, would be an 
offense under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, 
(i) "Counterfeit substance" means: 
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any substance that without au-
. thorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, 
number, device, or any likeness of them, of a manufacturer, distributor, or dis-
penser other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, 
or dispensed the substance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance 
distributed by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or 
(ii) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance. 
(j) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer 
of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not an agency relation-
ship exists. . . . 
(k) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(1) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means: 
(i) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid or any of the salts of 
barbituric acid; 
(ii) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(A) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; 
(B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine; 
or 
(C): any substance which the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the At-
torney General of the United States after investigation has found and by regu-
lation designated habit-forming because of its stimulant effect on the central 
nervous system; 
(iii) lysergic acid diethylamide; or 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(n) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a physical, physio-
logical, pathological, or other condition including but not limited to the con-
ditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, allergy, hypersensitiv-
ity to food, underweight, and overweight; uses for supplying a particular die-
tary need which exist by reason of age including but not limited to the ages of 
infancy and childbirth, and also uses for supplementing and for fortifying the 
ordinary or unusual diet with any vitamin, mineral, or other dietary property 
for use of a food. Any particular use of a food is a special dietary use re-
gardless of the nutritional purposes. 
(u) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the Attorney General of the 
United States has found to be, and by regulation designated as being, the princi-
pal compound used or produced primarily for use in the manufacture of a controlled 
substance, or which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be 
used in the manufacture of a controlled substance, the control of which is neces-
sary to prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of the controlled substance. 
(v) "Indian" means a member of an Indian tribe. 
(w) "Indian religion" means any religion: 
(I) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian 
culture or community; and 
(n) which is practiced by Indians. 
x^) "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other organized group 
or community of Indians, including any Alaska Native village, which is legally 
recognized as eligible for and is consistent with the special programs, services, 
and entitlements provided by the United States to Indians because of their status 
as Indians. 
(y) "Manufactureff means tne production, preparation, propagation, compounding, or 
processing of a controlled substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction 
from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis 
or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, 
(z) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or labels any 
container of any controlled substance, except pharmacists who dispense or compound 
prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate consumer. 
(aa) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus cannabis and all parts of the ge-
nus, whether growing or not; the seeds of it; the resin extracted from any part 
of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or 
preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin. The term does not include the ma-
ture stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from 
the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mix-
ture, or preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted from them, 
fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of ger-
mination. Any synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant can-
nabis sativa or any other species of the genus cannabis which are chemically in-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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the person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over 
it. 
(lj) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, pharmacist, scien-
tific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered, or 
otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, ad-
minister, or use in teaching or chemical analysis a controlled substance m the 
course of professional practice or research in this state. 
(kk) "Prescribe" means to issue a prescription orally or in writing. 
(11) "Prescription" means an order issued by a licensed practitioner, in the 
course of that practitioner's professional practice, for a controlled substance, 
other drug, or device which it dispenses or administers for use by a patient or an 
animal. The order may be issued by word of mouth, written document, telephone, 
facsimile transmission, computer, or other electronic means of communication as 
defined by rule. 
(mm) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or har-
vesting of a controlled substance. 
(nn) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of debt or of 
property. 
(oo) "State" means the state of Utah. 
(pp) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully possesses a controlled sub-
stance for his own use, for the use of a member of his household, or for admini-
stration to an animal owned by him or a member of his household. 
(2) If a term used in this chapter is not defined, the definition and terms of Ti-
tle 76, Utah Criminal Code, shall apply. 
Laws 1971, c. 145, § 2; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 3; Laws 1979, c. 12, § 1; Laws 1981, 
c. 75, § 1; Laws 1982, c. 12, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 190, § 1/ Laws 1989, c. 50, § 
1; Laws 1989, c. 186, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 225, § 60; Laws 1991, c. 198, § 1; 
Laws 1992, c. 121, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 132, § 2; Laws 1996, c. 170, § 53, eff. 
July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 294, § 1, eff. Apiil 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 64, § 2, 
eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2003, c. 131, § 40, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 2*1, § 
1, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 283, § 2, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2006, c. 8, § 
2, eff. May 1, 2006. 
[FN1] 21 U.S.C.a. § 812. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Dangerous weapons, possession by certain persons, see § 76-10-503. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 37. UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts—Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to know-
ingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, of-
fer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; 
or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in 
any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d 
that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of 
Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are un-
dertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person 
occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of manage-
ment . 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, 
or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second de-
gree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first de-
gree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a 
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a 
second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
U T ST § 58-37-8 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 
Page 3 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other con-
trolled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including 
less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a sec-
ond conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or 
subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exte-
rior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in 
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sen-
tenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if 
the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an inde-
terminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indetermi-
nate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an inde-
terminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concur-
rently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2) (a) (ii) or (2) (a) (iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an of-
fense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his 
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent man-
ner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death 
of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those de-
scribed in Subsection (2) (h) (ii), or a controlled substance classified under 
Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
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(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on 
the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-
501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, 
playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, de-
livery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate 
or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b) (i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the pen-
alty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have 
been a first degree felony. (ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not 
be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have 
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person con-
victed under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum 
penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a 
violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted 
for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indetermi-
nate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and 
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fined in Subsection 58-37-4(2) (a) (iii) (V), it is an affirmative defense that the 
peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional 
ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian relig-
ion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirma-
tive defense under this Subsection (10) as soon as practicable, but not later than 
ten days prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for 
good cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of 
timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection 
(10) by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a 
complete defense to the charges. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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1 anyone until after the trial. 
2 THE WITNESS: Okay, sir. 
3 THE COURT: Do you have anything else? 
4 MS. GARLAND: Your Honor, may we have a brief 
5 recess to confer with Mr. Setoki about whether or not we plan 
6 to have him testify? 
7 THE COURT: We'll take a brief recess and we ask 
8 you not to discuss the case, form an opinion or let others 
9 discuss it with you. 
10 Please rise for the jury. 
11 (Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
12 THE COURT: Ms. Garland, I don't know how many days 
13 you've had to prepare for this plus the noon hour. Why is 
14 this a surprise now? 
15 MS. GARLAND: It's not a surprise Your Honor. I 
16 just wanted to take one last few minutes and be sure. But 
17 you're right, we've had months and months. It's just I 
18 wanted to see how the evidence came out before we made that 
19 decision. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to make your motion? 
21 MS. GARLAND: Thank you Your Honor. This is for, 
22 as you know, it's a Motion for Directed Verdict for the 
23 purpose of preserving the record Your Honor. I realize that 
24 the standard is very low; however, it would be my motion that 
25 the lack of any kind of physical corroborating evidence 
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